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Recent Developments

Hyle v. Motor Vehicle Admin.:

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held in Hyle v.
Motor Vehicle Admin.,
348 Md. 143, 702 A.2d 760
(1997), that a motorist who has
agreed to a breath test for
alcohol concentration,
but
cannot be tested because a
qualified technician is not
available to administer the test,
may not be required to submit
to a blood test. The court ruled
that
the
Motor
Vehicle
Administration may not suspend
the license of a motorist under
such circumstances.
Police officers pulled over
Matthew John Hyle on the
morning of January 26, 1996
after he was seen driving
through a red light and crossing
over double yellow lines. Hyle
had alcohol on his breath and
after questioning, he told officers
that he had consumed a few
drinks.
Police
officers
subsequently administered a
number of field sobriety tests,
and because Hyle was unable to
successfully
complete
a
determinative test, he was
arrested on suspicion of driving
while intoxicated.
Hyle was
consequently taken to the
Central District Police Station in
Baltimore City.
At the police station, Hyle
was informed that if he either
refused to take a test for alcohol
concentration or if he was found
to have an alcohol content level
of 0.1 or more, his license could
be suspended. Hyle agreed to a
breath test; however, because
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no qualified person was available
to perform the test, Hyle was told
that he would have to be taken
to a hospital where he would be
required to submit to a blood
test.
Hyle refused, and
consequently, his license was
suspended for three months
pursuant to section 16-205 of the
Transportation Article of the
Annotated Code of Maryland,
which provides for the automatic
suspension of a motorist's
license where a motorist refuses
to take an alcohol concentration
test.
Following suspension of his
driver's license, Hyle requested,
and
was
granted,
an
administrative hearing. At the
hearing, the administrative law
judge affirmed the suspension of
Hyle's license, reasoning that the
absence of a technician to
administer a breath
test
amounted to the unavailability of
equipment. The ALJ further
determined
that
Hyle's

unwillingness to submit to a
blood test was tantamount to a
refusal to submit to an alcohol
test under section 16-205.1 of
the Transportation Article.
Hyle appealed the decision to
the Circuit Court for Worcester
County where the ALJ's decision
was affirmed.
Hyle then
appealed to the Court of Appeals
of Maryland and certiorari was
granted.
The court began its opinion
by examining Maryland statutory
provisions concerning drunk
driving. Hyle, 348 Md. at 146,
702 A.2d at 761. The court
noted that under section 16205.1 (a)(2) of the Transportation
Article, a motorist who drives on
property used by the public, and
is stopped on suspicion of
driving while intoxicated or under
the influence of alcohol, is
considered to have given implied
consent to take an alcohol test.
Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN.,
Transp.
II
section
16205.1 (b)( 1)(i)2.A. (Supp. 1997».
As set forth in section 16205.1 (a)(1 )(iii)
of
the
Transportation Article, one of two
types of alcohol tests may be
administered
in
such
circumstances: the breath test or
the blood test. Id. at 147, 702
A.2d at 762. Both tests require
the use of "equipment approved
by the toxicologist" and, that they
be administered only by a
"qualified person". Id. (citing MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
sections 10-304(a) and (c),(Supp
1997)(hereinafter "C&J").
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Maryland C&J section 10305(a) provides that the breath
test is the test to be administered
in all cases, with only three
exceptions wherein the blood
test may be administered. Id.
The court recognized that a
blood test may be given only
when: (1) the defendant is
unconscious or unable to refuse
a test, (2) the defendant is
injured and must be taken to a
hospital, or, (3) breath-test
equipment is not available. Id.
The court focused on the final
exception and set out to
determine whether the word
"equipment", as used in the
Maryland statute, encompassed
a qualified technician. Id. at 148,
702 A.2d at 762. The court
noted that "only if the equipment
was unavailable, would Hyle's
refusal to take a blood test have
violated [Transportation section]
16-205.1".
Id. (emphasis
added).
In interpreting the meaning of
the term "equipment", the court
examined the actual intent of the
legislature, and looked to the
plain language of the statute. Id.
In doing so, the court turned to
the dictionary definition of the
term
"equipment":
"the
implements used in an operation
or activity". Id. at 149, 702 A.2d
at 762 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(1986». The court determined
that "the term equipment, on its
face, would seem to encompass
the apparatus or machine used
to test for alcohol levels and not
the
qualified
technician
necessary to administer the test."
Id.
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Additionally,
the
court
continued, construing the term
"equipment" to include a
technician would render other
portions of the statutory scheme
concerning
drunk
driving
superfluous and redundant. Id. at
149-50, 702 A.2d at 763. The
court pOinted out that C&J
section 10-304(a)(3) states that
a qualified person is one who
receives training in the use of
equipment in a program
approved by a toxicologist. Id. at
149,702 A.2d at 763. Similarly,
C&J section 10-304(b) sets forth
that the equipment used for a
breath test must be approved by
a toxicologist. Id. Therefore, if a
technician was included in the
term "equipment," only one of
the two statutes would be
necessary. Id. at 150,702 A.2d
at 763.
Furthermore, the legislature
illustrated its willingness to use
the terms "equipment" and
"qualified person" exclusively as
by its distinct
evidenced
references to each in the
pertinent statutes. Id. at 151,
702 A.2d at 763. C&J sections
10-304(b) and 10-304(c)(1 )(i),
for example, state that "blood
and breath tests must be
administered by a 'qualified
person'
with
'equipment
approved by the toxicologist'" Id.
(emphasis added). The court
finally looked to the legislative
history of C&J section 10-305
and determined that the
legislature did not intend the
term "equipment" to encompass
a technician. Id. at 151, 702
A.2d at 764.

The court explained that the
legislature, after balancing the
advantages and disadvantages
of blood and breath tests,
resolved that breath tests would
be the test administered in most
cases. Id. at 151-56, 702 A.2d
at 764-66.
The court further determined
that the legislature specified the
test to be used in drunk-driving
cases to prevent police officers
from using their own discretion in
deciding which test to administer.
Id. at 151,156, 702 A.2d at
764,66. The court opined that by
including a qualified person to
fall within the meaning of
would
equipment,
officers
essentially have discretion to
choose which test to apply. Id. at
156, 702 A.2d at 766. For
example, police officers could
schedule technicians to work
,only certain hours, thereby
making them available at their
discretion, which the court noted,
would be contrary to the
legislature's intent. Id.
This decision strictly adheres
to the plain language and
meaning of C&J section 10-305.
The court, in reaching its
deCiSion, carefully considered
legislative history, and the
common
scheme of the
Maryland statutes concerning
drunk driving, maintaining the
intent and spirit of the legislature.
The court's findings further
preserved and ensured the
statute's intent to safeguard
against discretionary police
interference and protect "the
integrity of an individual's
person.

